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Update in process July, 2010.

Captain Hans Langsdorff - Seventy Years in Purgatory: A Military Enigma!

In February 2010 Langsdorff`s log book came to light in a Spanish edition in Montevideo. La Armada Nacional in Pocitos has limited copies of "Admiral Graf Spee" Diario de Guerra. At last, historians can consider the captain`s problems and decisions directly from the source.

Thursday 14 December 1939, Uruguay suddenly burst onto global headlines. Front line naval action filled the news. A German pocket battleship lay in the neutral harbor of Montevideo. British cruisers waited in the River Plate estuary, eager to re-engage the enemy warship when she came out. Captain Hans Langsdorff’s three month raiding campaign with Admiral Graf Spee had sunk nine British freighters, without any loss of life. But the previous day, 13th December, he encountered three hostile cruisers in the South Atlantic. The resultant action left the pocket battleship with crippling damage. She sought sanctuary in Montevideo.

Seventy years have passed since the Battle of the River Plate but the jury is still out regarding the military competence of Captain Hans Langsdorff. History correctly credits the commander of the Graf Spee as an honorable, chivalrous naval officer. However, a wide range of expert opinion clouds the captain’s military conduct in the Graf Spee saga. Some historians claim that he fell short in the crucial military decisions he made before and after the battle.

Clear evidence is now available in the KTB (kriegstagebuch & Spanish edition) for students of history to properly evaluate Langsdorff’s military contribution in the Graf Spee situation. Countless books, magazine articles and TV documentaries from competent sources, including one semi-fictional film, fail to defend the captain. Admiral Raeder’s book My Life at Sea blandly states that Langsdorff lost his ship because he attacked three cruisers. Raider avoids any reasoning to explain why the captain took such action. A recent book The Price of Disobedience by an acclaimed author accuses the captain of disobeying orders. Certainly, Langsdorff’s standing orders, issued in August, ruled that Graf Spee evade combat with warships, even if inferior. However, fairness demands we examine factual evidence to ascertain why Langsdorff apparently side-stepped his standing orders and engaged three British cruisers.

In a rendezvous with Altmark on 26 November 1939, seventeen days before the famous battle, Langsdorff wrote in his log that Spee’s diesel engines needed dock overhaul. In three months at sea, including twice around the Cape of Good Hope, excessive vibrations had ruptured and split many of the auxiliary engine supports. This led to out of round pistons in the main engines. Speed was reduced to 23kn. and they could not prevent emitting funnel smoke.

Langsdorff reviewed the raiding mission. He knew the names and caliber of the British warships protecting the South American coast (two 8-inch gunned heavy cruisers and two 6-inch gunned light cruisers). Facing new unexpected circumstances Langsdorff presumed the responsibility to review his standing orders. At this time the fighting capacity of any pocket battleship remained unknown. The captain intended to test his ship in favorable battle conditions. He stated in his log that if he pressed an attack Spee’s 11-inch guns should succeed against a warship if inferior in class to the battle cruiser HMSRenown. Langsdorff advised his senior officers that they would continue the raiding mission while going home but would engage an enemy cruiser if an attractive opportunity arose to capture a significant prize.

Then located in mid-Atlantic, Langsdorff set a course toward Santos Bay, Brasil. He hoped to catch a prize when merchant ships left the security of the neutral coast to cross the huge bay. En route toward Brasil, Graf Spee successfully captured two more merchants, Doric Star on 2nd December (19º15’S / 5º5`E) and Tairoa on 3rd December (21º38’S / 3º13’W). Both these ships sent wireless signals that gave warning to shipping. Commodore Harwood , commanding the South American Cruiser Division, received the information and carefully calculated the apparent route of the raider. He ordered his three available cruisers to group and protect the River Plate traffic.

On 6th December Spee drew crude diesel fuel and supplies from Altmark. Langsdorff also transferred 144 prisoners taken from previous prizes. He kept on board Graf Spee twenty-six senior officers and three wounded lads from Tairoa. Later in the night, the crew practiced searchlight drills with Altmark. When they had finished the drill, an alarm rang throughout the ship. A distant vessel was running without lights at 24º37'S / 21º52'W. Langsdorff did not wish to use his wireless and carelessly betray Spee’s position nor ruthlessly sink the mysterious ship without warning. He decided to remain incognito and quickly resumed his course toward Brasil while monitoring for wireless signals. The ghost ship was never identified but it may have later reported sighting the German ships

Next day, 7th December, Spee captured Streonstalh (24ºS /27ºW). The prize crew retrieved a canvas bag found floating in the sea close to the ship. It contained specific information (co-ordinates) showing the exact routing of Streonshalh leaving the Plate. The origin of this controversial bag has never been explained. Captain J.J. Robinson vigorously and continuously claimed that he had personally dropped his secret documents, two weighted bags, into the sea and saw them sink.

The British Consular Shipping Advisory Group, a small intelligence unit headed by Captain Hammond RN and Commander Johnson RN, may have previously contacted Streonshalh. They were aware that an enemy raider now operated in her projected path.

Located on the top floor of el Edificio Bolsa Comercio .(Calle Rincon 454 Montevideo) they had wireless access to shipping that sailed in South American waters. On the same floor, with the British consulate located one floor below, John Garland ran a Marconi wireless station. Also, in Montevideo foreign intelligence operatives made casual contact with each other at this time. Meanwhile, British merchant ships were back-logging in Montevideo

Coincidentally, Langsdorff that same day, 7th December, received a wireless signal from SKL in Berlin advising that four merchant ships had left the Plate on 5th December. The signal gave the names of the four ships and specific tonnages, Highland Monarch (14,000brt), Marconi (7,400brt), Ashbury (3,901brt) and Southgate (4,862brt).

Langsdorff carefully examined this wealth of information. He had planned to screen Santos Bay and then head south, briefly show his flag and then turn north to return to Germany. Now primed with fresh success, he decided to sweep along Streonshalh`s outbound route. Possibly they might encounter all or part of SKL’s reputed convoy. If accompanied with an escort, perhaps Cumberland or Exeter, Langsdorff, expected success against an 8-inch cruiser. On 9th December Streonshalh`s route was confirmed when 1st Officer Mallinson, then a prisoner on Spee, gave up astrological notes that confirmed the merchant`s route. Now heading south-west, Spee received a wireless signal from SKL advising that HMSAchilles was in Montevideo on 10th December. Next day, recurring problems with the Arado’s air-cooled engine permanently grounded the spotter plane.

At dawn 13th December, Graf Spee lookouts, using the main telemeter optics on the fore top, reported masts on the horizon. As they closed the sighting, the Germans discovered that the masts rose from three British cruisers of the South American Division, Exeter, Ajax and Achilles in company at 32ºS / 47ºW. Simultaneously, the British lookouts sighted Spee’s smoke emissions. Commodore Harwood had cleverly and fortunately forecast the German warship’s approach to the Plate. Perhaps Langsdorff could have turned away and fought a running battle but considering Spee’s engine problems the three British warships had almost 10-knots speed advantage. Langsdorff expected they would report his location then trail him until larger capital ships could make contact, thereby holding the initiative.

Boldly, he decided to follow his earlier assessment and concentrate an attack on Exeter, his largest opponent. To Langsdorff’s surprise the British ships did not fall back out of his range but also attacked, in two separate divisions. Eighty minutes of furious battle left Exeter neutralized. Burning , totally helpless she appeared finished. Langsdorff did not send her to the bottom but moved his main guns to target the on charging light cruisers.

However, Graf Spee had taken a catastrophic 8-inch hit from Exeter at the beginning of the battle. This shell demolished a boiler room that produced high pressure steam needed to move and clean raw fuel from the storage bunkers into day tanks. In effect this damage cut off her fuel supply. She had only 16hrs of pre cleaned usable fuel in ready tanks and no possibility of making repairs at sea. Langsdorff was forced to find immediate asylum in a neutral port and decided to go into Montevideo. He advised Berlin of his intention with a distinct note despite possible entrapment.

Several hours later, before Spee had entered the estuary, Berlin acknowledged his declared decision. Ajax and Achilles trailed Spee into the Plate estuary and kept watch when she harbored in the neutral port.

On the run-in to Montevideo Langsdorff personally inspected the ship’s damage. It was a crushing, traumatic disappointment to realize that his iconic pocket battleship was over classified. Graf Spee could not endure an 8-inch shell, her engines did not live up to expectations, and her fuel flow system was extremely vulnerable. Langsdorff’’s high naval classification and inside knowledge of Admiral Raeder’s intense ambition to build a powerful battle fleet let him see the big picture. Spee’s problems applied equally to her two sister ships, Admiral Scheer and Deutschland. This left only the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as the reliable capital ship inventory of the German navy. Such vital information must remain secret, not only from the enemy but also from the navy’s enemy within - Goering, Himmler, Goebbels etc. The captain accepted full responsibility for his military situation and assumed a leadership role in its resolution.

In Montevideo the politicians battled for best advantage. Busy feet hurried between the German legation in the Plaza Zabala, and the British consulate in el Edificio de Bolsa Comercio and Palacio Santos where Alberto Guani sat as Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs. Otto Langmann (German Representative) and Eugen Millington-Drake (British Representative) pestered Guani relentlessly. Meanwhile Langsdorff focused on the military conundrum - he must keep his ship out of enemy hands and prevent close inspection. Could he expect success in a breakout attempt when his ship was repaired? Extremely shallow and uncertain water conditions in the estuary demanded he reach deep water where as a final choice Spee might be irretrievably scuttled. But they must survive several hours of battle through a gauntlet of enemy warships to reach suitable water depths.